

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03380 01 OF 02 151200Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
OMB-01 AID-05 ACDA-12 SSM-03 /085 W
-----034160 151236Z /21

R 151108Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5754
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3380

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, JO, XF
SUBJECT: SHARAF-JORDANIANS AND AN ARAB SUMMIT

REF: A) AMMAN 3178; B) AMMAN 3254

SUMMARY: JORDAN CONTINUES TO CIRCULATE IN THE ARAB
WORLD MESSAGES PROPOSING A SUMMIT WITH SOME SPECIFIC
SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT TO DO THERE. COURT CHIEF SHARAF
SAYS THAT THERE ARE NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS FOR RESULTS.
SYRIA MOST NEGATIVE. SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS POLITE, BUT
AT BEST LUKEWARM. EGYPTIANS ARE POSITIVE, BUT MANEUVERING
FOR TIME. JORDAN'S NEXT STEP WILL BE TO ALLOW A PERIOD
FOR REFLECTION AND AT SAME TIME TO PROVIDE FOR A MORE
PUBLIC AIRING OF SOME OF ITS SPECIFIC IDEAS FOR ARAB
"COORDINATION." SHARAF TENDED TO DOWNPLAY POTENTIALLY
ROUGH EDGES (FOR US) OF SOME OF HIS IDEAS--I.E., ARAB
FINANCIAL COORDINATION TO BRING PRESSURE ON U.S. END SUMMARY

1. COURT CHIEF SHARAF REVIEWED FOR US JORDANIAN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03380 01 OF 02 151200Z

ACTIVITIES, OBJECTIVES, AND RECENT CONTACTS IN
CONNECTION WITH HOLDING AN ARAB SUMMIT.

2. SUMMARIZING JORDAN'S STRATEGY, SHARAF PUT
STRESS ON FOLLOWING POINTS:
(A) ARABS NEED TO GET TOGETHER. ISRAELI
INVASION OF SOUTH LEBANON WITH IMPUNITY WAS ANOTHER

SIGN OF ARAB IMPOTENCE. FIRST PRIORITY HAD TO BE GIVEN TO COORDINATION OF POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES. JORDAN'S MOVE WAS DEFENSIVE;

(B) SECOND OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET BACK TERRITORY OCCUPIED IN 1967 AND SECURE FOR PALESTINIANS RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION;

(C) PALESTINIANS (PLO) PLAY TOO DOMINANT A ROLE AND HAVE TOO LARGE A CAPACITY FOR SPOILING ARAB MODERATES' INITIATIVES. THEY MUST BE CONTAINED BY BRINGING ARABS TOGETHER AND BRINGING PLO WITHIN AMBIT OF JOINT EFFORTS OF ARABS;

(D) SADAT INITIATIVE WAS NOT GETTING ANYWHERE IN ARAB WORLD, BUT APPEARED TO BE MAKING A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT IN THE U.S. EFFORTS TO KEEP IT GOING WOULD BENEFIT FROM STEPS TO BRING ARABS TOGETHER WITHOUT ABANDONING SADAT'S ACHIEVEMENTS;

(E) ARAB MODERATES WOULD ONLY LOSE IF THEY ABANDONED FIELD NOW TO RADICALS.

3. MORE REALISTICALLY, SHARAF ADDED AN ADDITIONAL POINT THAT IF RADICALS PULLED THE AREA INTO CONFLICT, JORDAN AT LEAST WAS BUILDING A PLAUSIBLE REASON FOR EXCUSING ITSELF FROM PARTICIPATION SINCE ITS OWN IDEAS AND PROPOSALS HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED.

4. SHARAF CONFIRMED THAT IN HIS TRAVELS HE FOUND SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS SUPPORTIVE OF JORDAN'S EFFORTS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03380 01 OF 02 151200Z

WHILE ASAD WAS POLITELY BUT FIRMLY NEGATIVE UK SHARAF CHALKS UP MUCH OF SAUDI ACCEPTANCE TO ARAB POLITENESS AND SAUDIS UNFAILING QUALITY OF TELLING GUESTS WHAT THEY THINK GUESTS WOULD LIKE TO HEAR. KUWAITIS WERE SHREWDER AND PROBABLY DID NOT BELIEVE ANYTHING WAS GOING AHEAD SOON. ASAD WAS GRACIOUS BUT LEFT NO DOORS OPEN TO ATTENDANCE AT A SUMMIT. HE SAID U.S. HAD ABANDONED ALL POSSIBILITIES OF INFLUENCING ISRAELIS. BEGIN HAD WANTED TO SUCK SYRIA INTO A WAR IN LEBANON. SYRIA WOULD NEVER AGREE TO SIT DOWN WITH SADAT UNTIL HE CLOSED THE DOOR TO JERUSALEM INITIATIVE AND AGREED TO COORDINATE ALL HIS ACTIONS WITH THE OTHER ARABS. JORDAN'S SUMMIT INITIATIVE WAS ONLY A WAY TO ISOLATE SYRIA AND BRING OTHER ARABS AROUND TO SUPPORTING SADAT SINCE JORDAN WAS PROPOSING A SUMMIT WHICH WOULD NOT "REFORM" OR CONDEMN SADAT AND WAS INDEED CREATING A MIDDLE BLOCK OF ARAB STATES WHICH WOULD BE "NEUTRAL" TOWARD SADAT. ASAD SAID THAT HUSSEIN, RATHER THAN COMPLAINING ABOUT SYRIA'S FAILURE TO DEFEND SOUTH LEBANON AGAINST THE ISRAELIS, SHOULD HAVE ATTACKED THE ISRAELIS HIMSELF SINCE JORDAN HAD FORCES CLOSER TO ISRAEL'S THAN

WERE THE SYRIANS IN SOUTH LEBANON.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03380 02 OF 02 151155Z
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11
OMB-01 AID-05 ACDA-12 SSM-03 /085 W
-----034103 151237Z /21

R 151108Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5755
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 3380

5. SHARAF WENT OVER SOME OF THE POINTS IN THE JORDANIAN "WORKING PAPER" PRESENTED TO THE OTHER ARABS THIS WEEK BY JORDANIAN EMISSARIES (REFTELS). HE TENDED TO SOFT PEDAL SOME OF THE POTENTIALLY ROUGHER EDGES (FOR US) ON THE POINTS MADE BY THE JORDANIANS. ON ARAB MILITARY COOPER TVON, HE SAID THAT PROPOSAL OF JORDAN DID NOT INVOLVE A UNIFIED ARAB COMMAND, BUT ONLY COORDINATION OF STRATEGY, ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR FRONT LINE STATES, AND MAKING THE BEST USE OF MILITARY FORCES. HE SAID THAT OIL STATES HAD BEEN ASKED TO COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS IN MANAGING RESOURCES AND THE FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS AVAILABLE TO THEM. ASAD FOUND THIS A LAUDABLE BUT WEAK STATEMENT ACCORDING TO SHARAF.

6. REACTIONS FROM OTHER CAPTIALS, NOT VISITED BY SHARAF BUT BY OTHER JORDANIANS, WERE INCOMPLETE. HUSNI MUBARAK APPARENTLY MADE FRIENDLY NOISES TO JORDANIAN MINISTER OF STATE HASSAN IBRAHIM IN CAIRO. SHARAF SAID HE IS CERTAIN SADAT WILL DO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03380 02 OF 02 151155Z

WHAT HE CAN TO MANEUVER AROUND THE IDEA IN ORDER
TO KEEP THE PROPOSAL FROM COMING TO FRUWTION.
SHARAF TOOK CREDIT IN THIS SENSE XFOR BUYING TIME
FOR EGYPT AND THE U.S. HE LAMENTED SADAT'S RECENT
"THOUGHTLESS" HANDLING OF THE ARABS, COMPLAINING
THAT IT WOULD HELP ENORMOUSLY IF HE WOULD SHOW
JUST A LITTLE BIT OF FLEXIBILITY AND UNDERSTANDING
OF THE OTHER ARABS--"ABOUT ONE-TENTH OF WHAT HE
SHOWS FOR BEGIN AND WEIZMAN." NEXT STAGE OF JORDAN'S EFFORTS
WILL BE TIME FOR FURTHER REFLECTION IN ARAB
CAPITALS AND MORE PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF SOME OF JORDAN'S
IDEAS IN AMMAN AND THE ARAB WORLD.

7. COMMENT: SHARAF SEEMS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS
THAT HUSSEIN'S INITIATIVE IS GOING ANYWHERE.
BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANYTHING ESLE, HE AND HUSSEIN
CLEARLY FEEL THAT IT IS BETTER TO BE TALKING AND
ACTING IN THE ARAB WORLD THAN LETTING SOMEONE
ELSE DO IT-- AND WHO KNOWS, AT SOME POINT THE
SEED CAST MAY SPROUT ON FERTILE GROUND.
PICKERING

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARABS, SUMMIT MEETINGS, PLANNING MEETINGS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978AMMAN03380
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780162-0719
Format: TEL
From: AMMAN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780453/aaaabsou.tel
Line Count: 193
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 791728ad-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 AMMAN 3178, 78 AMMAN 3254
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2957169
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SHARAF-JORDANIANS AND AN ARAB SUMMIT
TAGS: PGOV, JO, XF, (SHARAF, SHARIF)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/791728ad-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014